"Unsigning" the TPP

Earlier today Donald Trump "unsigned" the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement involving twelve Pacific Rim states that was negotiated by the Obama administration in order to reduce tariffs while protecting labor rights, the environment, and intellectual property rights. Trump's action was applauded by Sen. Bernie Sanders while being criticized by a number of Republicans including Sen. John McCain and Sen. John Cornyn.

"Unsigning" the TPP was a largely symbolic act because it had not been ratified by the United States, nor was it likely to be given the hostility of Republicans in the Senate to virtually every proposal submitted by Barack Obama since they regained control of the chamber in 2015. Nevertheless, international law (in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) requires states that have signed but not yet ratified a treaty to "refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty. (The U.S. has also not ratified the Vienna Convention, but many of its provisions are considered binding as customary international law.) By signaling its intent to jettison the TPP, Trump has eliminated even the mild obligation to avoid acts contrary to the agreement's object and purpose.

More importantly, however, this action on the TPP, together with an announcement yesterday that Trump would seek to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signals the beginning of an effort to reverse a longstanding bipartisan policy of promoting free trade. Since the creation of the Bretton Woods system at the end of World War II, the United States has encouraged--and often led--global efforts to expand trade in the belief that free trade increases wealth while also promoting peace. Free trade, in fact, is an important part of the post-World War II global security architecture. Trump's "America First" approach threatens American prosperity and security.

Refugees

Those who are looking for absolute security are on the wrong planet. This one has life.

The Crypto-War

Here's the question: Would you rather have perfect encryption capable of ensuring that you (and everyone else who uses the Internet) can keep your movements online hidden from the government or would you prefer that the government be able to hack into the Internet accounts of traffickers and terrorists (even if that means innocent people also lose their privacy online, at least some of the time)? Put another way, to what extent are you willing to trade privacy rights for some additional increment of security? Or is that even the right way to think about the encryption issue?

BBC News security correspondent Gordon Corera provides an informative history of data encryption in a story that asks who's winning the crypto-war?

Meanwhile, Google is playing its part in the crypto-war by routinely encrypting Google searches in China, thus complicating the Chinese government's efforts to monitor or censor certain sites. The Google search engine, however, has only a small share of China's market, which is dominated by Baidu.

Climate and Social Stress

In a report commissioned by the U.S. intelligence community, the National Research Council has concluded that the acceleration of climate change means "disruptive environmental events" will occur with increasing frequency and growing impact on national and global security. The study, titled Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, was prepared by a team led by John Steinbruner, director of the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies.

The study's summary states:

     Anthropogenic climate change can reasonably be expected to increase the frequency and intensity of a variety of potentially disruptive environmental events--slowly at first, but then more quickly. Some of this change is already discern- ible. Many of these events will stress communities, societies, governments, and the globally integrated systems that support human well-being. Science is unlikely ever to be able to predict the timing, magnitude, and precise location of these events a decade in advance, but much is already known that can inform security analysis, including details about the character of events that are becoming more likely and about the general trajectory of increasing risk.

The New York Times summarizes the report and includes comments from Steinbruner in an article here.

Fifty Years Ago

Fifty years ago today, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy delivered the following message to the American people.

Misreading History

We are exactly fifty years removed from the opening days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, one of the most extensively analyzed episodes in history. A brief bibliography published online by the Naval History and Heritage Command lists over fifty books on the events of those "thirteen days," to quote the title of Robert F. Kennedy's own book on the subject. Unfortunately, extensive analysis cannot guarantee that the right lessons will be learned.

Michael Dobbs makes this point in an essay in yesterday's New York Times. A single historical error, he argues, has contributed to the myth that John F. Kennedy's firm resolve--his willingness to face down both Khrushchev and the prospect of nuclear war--was decisive in an American victory in the Cold War. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it, "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked."

But Rusk got it wrong, according to Dobbs, and leaders from Lyndon Johnson to George W. Bush and Benjamin Netanyahu have also gotten it wrong, believing that being tough like JFK yields victories like the one he supposedly won in the Cuban Missile Crisis. And thus we wind up in wars, somehow missing the point that Kennedy and Khrushchev were desperately trying to avoid a war.

Someday a candidate for the presidency of the United States will say, "I yield to my opponent in the area of firm resolve. I hope I will never be eyeball to eyeball with America's enemies, but if I am, I will blink--and swallow hard. I will do whatever it takes to avoid war." He--or she--will lose the election--unless, between now and then, we stop misreading history.

Health Security and Bad Governance

Sometimes it helps to read the end of a news story first.

An article by Adam Nossiter published yesterday in the New York Times ("Cholera Epidemic Envelops Coastal Slums in West Africa") concludes with an observation from Jane Bevan, a sanitation specialist working with UNICEF in West Africa: "We know governments have the money for other things. I'm afraid sanitation is never given the priority it deserves."

The article describes a serious cholera outbreak centered in the slums of Freetown, Sierra Leone and Conakry, Guinea. Sierra Leone reports over 11,600 cases of cholera since January with 1,000 new cases each month. According to Doctors Without Borders, 250 to 300 people have died in Freetown and Conakry since February.

Cholera is a highly contagious disease caused primarily by exposure to the feces of an infected person. It causes vomiting and diarrhea leading to dehydration and electrolyte imbalances that, if not treated with rehydration therapy, may be fatal.

Heavy rains, which have caused flooding in shanty towns where sanitary toilets are rare, must be listed among the immediate causes of this outbreak. The existence of the shanty towns in Freeport and Conakry, however, owes much to a decade of civil war in Sierra Leone that drove many people from the countryside to the cities and to over fifty years of dictatorship in Guinea with similar effects on the distribution of population there. But if Jane Bevan is correct, these causes of the cholera outbreak could have been averted--or at least significantly mitigated--if the governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea had allocated resources in a way that took the health of their people into account. And this is something that Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seems to require. (See also Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.)

The primary responsibility of government--anywhere--is to ensure the security of its citizens. This responsibility is commonly, but improperly, framed in terms of national security with a focus on external military threats. But the most serious threats affecting people all over the world--that is, the threats most likely to kill or threaten the well-being of people, even in a state like Sierra Leone that has recently emerged from conflict--are not generally military threats. Disease, poverty, environmental degradation, climate change, political repression, and a host of other "soft" threats are what people must face more often than the "hard" threat of war. It is important, consequently, for governments (even in the developed world) to shift their focus from national security to human security.

The Security Paradox

Speaking at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government last week, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described changes in the security environment and how these are affecting defense planning.  Of particular note in the speech was his description of what he calls the "security paradox," which is the notion that although war has become less likely, "destructive technologies are available to a wider and more disparate pool of adversaries," including individuals and other non-state actors.  The result, he concludes, is that our more peaceful world is also more threatening.  In this and other respects, Gen. Dempsey's analysis echoes many of the points that Dan Caldwell and I make in Seeking Security in an Insecure World.

Gen. Dempsey began by noting the importance of the way we conceptualize the security environment.  "How we think about security, about the security environment, carries important consequences for our nation and for me, particularly for how we build our military."  This, it seems to me, is a far cry from the more traditional assumption that there are objective facts--about power, geography, and national interests, for example--that guide policy in the realm of national security.  Carrying the point further, Gen. Dempsey said, "Our own inertia can blind us to new truths standing right before our eyes. Our preconceived notions can obscure the weak signals of impending change and those are the most important signals."

 

Addressing the "security paradox," Gen. Dempsey noted that ballistic missiles have become part of the arsenals of mid-level powers, that bombs made of fertilizer can destroy mine-resistant military vehicles, and that cyber attacks capable of crippling a society can be launched by an individual.  "What truly concerns me as chairman is that these lethal and destructive technologies are proliferating in two directions.  They're proliferating horizontally across advanced militaries in the world, and they're proliferating vertically, down to non-state actors, especially insurgents, terrorist groups and even transnational organized crime.  As a result, more people have the ability to harm us or deny us the ability to act than at any point in my life.  And that's the security paradox."

(A video of Gen. Dempsey's talk is available here.)

Arms Control: History, Theory, and Policy

Arms Control:  History, Theory, and Policy has just been published by Praeger Security International, an imprint of ABC-Clio.  The two-volume work contains thirty full-length essays by twenty-nine different authors including some of the most noteworthy experts in the field.  There are also thirteen biographical sketches of individuals who have made significant contributions to disarmament and arms control efforts, from Bertha von Suttner to Thomas C. Schelling and Jody Williams.

Among the essays are "Strategic Arms Control since World War II" by Jeff Larsen, "NGOs, Social Movements, and Arms Control" by Jeff Knopf, "Israel, Iran, and the Arms Control Paradox in the Middle East" by Brent Talbot, and "Dilemmas of Arms Control and Cybersecurity" by Chris Demchak.  My own contributions are an introduction entitled "Arms Control's Third Era" and an essay on "Arms Control and International Law."  My co-editor Paul Viotti contributed essays entitled "A Template for Understanding Arms Control" and "Arms Control and European Security During the Cold War."

For more information, click on the book cover beneath the blog archive on the right.

Cyberspace: The Anarchical Society?

Who owns the Internet?  A better question, and one more pertinent to understanding some of the major issues in international politics today, is Who governs cyberspace?  Some, including many of the Internet's most obsessive users, argue that no one governs cyberspace, nor should anyone attempt to govern it.  The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT Intellectual Property Act (PIPA), two bills that were, until last week, moving through Congress at the behest of major economic interests concerned about Internet piracy, were derailed because many netizens rebelled against this particular effort on the part of government to regulate cyberspace.  It was not the first time that the Internet had "organized," in its own disorganized fashion, to fight back against attempts to rein in the anarchy of cyberspace.

Saki Knafo, in a two-part story for the Huffington Post entitled "Anonymous and the War over the Internet" (see Part I and Part II), describes the "Chanology War of 2008" in which the Church of Scientology found itself under "attack" on the Internet and being protested--in a non-virtual way--on the sidewalks of 142 cities around the world for having pressured YouTube into removing a video of Tom Cruise rambling incoherently about Scientology.  Knafo regards this as the point at which the geeks gathering in certain IRC rooms began to realize they had the power to influence events irl (in real life).

The success in organizing anti-Scientology protests worldwide earned public recognition for a movement--if that is the right word--called "Anonymous."  Anonymous has no leaders, no hierarchy, no formal structure of any kind, and no members, in the usual sense of that term.  It does, however, have an ethos, one which is focused on preserving cyberspace as an unregulated sphere of activity--an anarchical society, if I may use the term Hedley Bull applied to the realm of international relations.  Consequently, Anonymous acts (and that generally means hacks) in defense of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks or Kim Dotcom and MegaUploads or others thought to be victims of efforts to curb Internet freedom.

It is not immediately clear how we ought to conceptualize cyberspace in terms of its relationship to government.  The U.S. Department of Defense (and other military organizations around the world) view it as the "fifth domain" of conflict (after land, sea, air, and outer space).  It is a realm of espionage and warfare--that is, another space in which U.S. national security interests must be defended.  The U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce see cyberspace as a medium of economic activity, but also a criminal wasteland.  It is a domain in which terrorists plot, digital pirates steal intellectual property, and hackers routinely defraud the Internet's most gullible users (your grandmother, perhaps) and occasionally wreak havoc on its most sophisticated users (your bank or credit card company).  The U.S. Department of State regards cyberspace as a tool for the spread of liberal values across the world.  What must be defended  in this conception are free access to uncensored information and free expression of political views.  Other parts of the U.S. Government view cyberspace as a venue for the dissemination of information, a tool for advanced communications, a means of spreading educational opportunity, or a forum for advocacy.  Cyberspace is all of these things and much more.

Norms for the governance of cyberspace are emerging, but not easily.  There are clashes of interests being played out between states (e.g., China and the U.S.) because states see themselves as the logical sources of regulation where regulation (perhaps in the form of arms control or copyright protection) is needed.  But here, as in so many other aspects of the emerging post-Westphalian system, states are not the only actors with interests and the ability to advance them forcefully.  As Anonymous has demonstrated on numerous occasions, there are cybercitizens who in a very real sense live in cyberspace and see it as territory to be defended against the encroachments of governments, corporations, international organizations, or interest groups.  And this fact adds a layer of complexity to efforts to develop forms of governance for this new anarchical society.

Oil and Water

A piece by Mark Landler in today's New York Times titled "A New Era of Gunboat Diplomacy" is well worth reading for those interested in the connection between oil and national security.  One-third of global oil production now occurs offshore and some of the hotspots for oil and natural gas exploration are in maritime regions where overlapping claims to jurisdiction have the potential to create problems:  the South China Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

Offshore production presents a number of serious environmental risks--one only has to recall the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico--but there can be security benefits from confining production to offshore platforms.  Oil production in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, avoids the serious political and military threats that plague production onshore in Nigeria and Angola.  If, however, the regime governing maritime jurisdiction established by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is contested or there are serious sovereignty disputes involving islands (as in the South China Sea), then offshore oil exploration and production may generate new security concerns.  If there are resource wars in our future, they may begin at sea.

Viktor Bout: Friend or Foe?

On Wednesday, November 2, the notorious arms dealer Viktor Bout was convicted in a federal court in Manhattan on four counts of conspiracy in connection with the sale of weapons to Colombian rebels.  Bout, who once advised the Soviet military in Africa, bought weapons and a fleet of cargo planes from the former Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and began trafficking arms to both governments and rebel forces in various conflicts around the world.  A British government report published in 2000 referred to him as "the Merchant of Death."  The movie Lord of War, which starred Nicholas Cage, was based on his exploits.

Here is the description of Bout in the second edition of Seeking Security in an Insecure World:

Bout is alleged to have sold over seven hundred surface-to-air missiles, military helicopters and airplanes, and thousands of guns to FARC, the Colombian paramilitary organization.  He has also sold weapons in Afghanistan and in various war zones in Africa.  At a Bangkok hotel in March 2008, Bout offered undercover agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency posing as FARC representatives a wide range of weapons, including land mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and C-4 explosives.  He was arrested at the conclusion of the meeting, which was taped, and, in August 2010, a Thai court ordered his extradition to stand trial in the United States.

In an op-ed published in the New York Times on Friday, Andrew Feinstein, author of The Shadow World:  Inside the Global Arms Trade (reviewed here by John Tirman), writes that in 2003 and 2004, Irbis Air--a company owned by Bout--flew supplies into Baghdad under contract to the U.S. Defense Department and KBR, a private contractor that was itself working for the U.S. Government.  Feinstein points out that "governments protect corrupt and dangerous arms dealers as long as they need them and then throw them behind bars when they are no longer useful."

Don't Forget to Read the Reviews

The toy alone is funny, but some of the reviews are hilarious. Take a look here. (Thank you, David.)

The Right Tone

"Our security emanates from the justness of our cause; the force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint."

--President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address

China's Military Strategy

The German news magazine Der Spiegel has an interesting interview with Chen Zhou, a PRC naval officer who teaches at the Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing. In it, Chen discusses the rationale for Chinese efforts to narrow the military gap between the PRC and the United States.

Here's an excerpt:

SPIEGEL: Why does China spend so much money on its military?

Chen Zhou: We understand very well that many countries are concerned when China grows not just in economic terms but also in military terms. But these fears are unfounded. We are not seeking a position of supremacy. We are in favor of peaceful development.

SPIEGEL: Then why the pronounced military buildup?

Chen: If we grow economically, we must also strengthen our military. We must protect our sovereignty, our unity and the country's security. Historically our military consisted primarily of land-based forces that were meant to protect our homeland. Since 1980, we have also been arming ourselves for other local conflicts and wars. Please do not forget the activities of the separatists in Taiwan ...

The complete interview is available here.